The Practice of Law & Authority - Common Law

In Sims v. Aherns, 271 S.W. 720 (1925), the Texas Court of Appeals held that "the practice of law is an occupation of common right." This means that the practice of law is a fundamental right that is not subject to state regulation or licensure. The court also noted that a bar card or membership in a bar association is not a license to practice law, but rather a dues card or membership card.

A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection. Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 238, 239

A common-law right is not the creature of a license law. 61 Ark. 486. A license implying a privilege cannot possibly exist with reference to something which is right, free and open to all. 49 L.R.A. (Ill.) 412. See also 107 U.S. 365

The Fordham Law Review text, along with the relevant case law including Frye v. Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc., In re Shoe Manufacturers Protective Ass'n, and Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. American Home Assurance Company, Inc., underscores the legal doctrine that prohibits corporations from engaging in the practice of law. This prohibition is rooted in both the statutory framework and public policy considerations aimed at ensuring high standards of legal service, ethical compliance, and client protection. Although corporations may attempt to engage indirectly in legal practice by employing licensed attorneys, such arrangements do not circumvent the foundational rule that the practice of law is reserved exclusively for individuals who meet the strict criteria for bar admission and professional accountability.

While a corporation is barred from directly practicing law, it may, by way of employing licensed attorneys, indirectly access legal services. The Fordham Law Review text explains that employing competent counsel who practice law on behalf of the corporation is considered an evasion the law disapproves of. Courts have scrutinized such arrangements to ensure that they do not subvert the fundamental prohibition by effectively having the corporation control legal work performed by its employees.

Pr Se Legal Academy
Coming Soon!

At JP & Associates, we advocate for pro se litigants, providing essential legal support, guidance, and education to uphold constitutional rights.

Who We Are

Dedicated to educating and empowering private citizens and Pro Se Litigants, we offer document drafting support, legal knowledge, and support to navigate the complexities of Common Law "The Law if The Land" legal system and Educating the Citizens from differentiating it from Article III Maritime Law the Law of the Water/Sea in which our courts automatically Presume/Assume Unlawful Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction - L.A.W. - Land. Air. Water.

This Shall Be the Most Important Video You Can Watch In this Modern Day.

Constitutional Advocacy Services

Empowering pro se litigants with legal knowledge, document drafting, and court procedure guidance.

Document Drafting

Expert assistance in creating legal documents tailored to your specific needs and circumstances.

Court Prep and Support

Providing preparation and support in court to ensure your rights are protected and upheld.

Are you in a situation where the PUBLIC OFFICIAL(cops, judges, attorneys, city employees, prosecutors etc. are claiming
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

CONTACT US IMMEDIATELY. WE CAN HELP!
Some Case Law to get you started.

Here are some cases where public officials lost qualified immunity, focusing on the reasons for the denial and the types of conduct involved. Here are some examples:

Zadeh v. Robinson (Zadeh v. Robinson): In this case, qualified immunity was denied to officers who conducted a search without a warrant or consent, and without exigent circumstances. The court found that the law was clearly established that such a search violated the Fourth Amendment.

Hope v. Pelzer (Hope v. Pelzer): This Supreme Court case addressed qualified immunity in the context of cruel and unusual punishment. The Court held that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because their actions (hitching a prisoner to a hitching post for an extended period) violated clearly established Eighth Amendment rights. The Court emphasized that officials can be held liable even if the specific conduct has not been previously held unlawful, as long as the existing law makes it clear that the conduct is unlawful.

Taylor v. Riojas (Taylor v. Riojas): The Supreme Court found that prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity after confining an inmate in "shockingly unsanitary conditions" for six full days. The court determined no reasonable officer could have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such a cell.

Anderson v. Blake (Anderson v. Blake): Qualified immunity was denied to a law enforcement officer who disclosed a video depicting the victim's rape. The court reasoned that the victim had a clearly established right to privacy in the video.

These cases illustrate some common scenarios where qualified immunity is denied:

Searches Without Warrants or Consent: Officers who conduct searches without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances lose qualified immunity.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Prison officials who subject inmates to cruel and unusual punishment, such as unsanitary conditions or excessive force, shall be denied qualified immunity.

Clearly Established Rights: If the official's conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right, and a reasonable official would have known that the conduct was unlawful, qualified immunity shall be denied.

These next cases and statutes specifically addressing conflicts of interest involving judges, mayors, and sheriffs. Here's a breakdown of the findings:

I. Judges

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.): This Supreme Court case established that due process requires recusal when a judge has a conflict of interest that creates a serious risk of actual bias. The case involved a judge who had received substantial campaign contributions from a party appearing before him.

Williams v. Pennsylvania (Williams v. Pennsylvania): This Supreme Court case held that a judge's prior involvement in a case as a prosecutor can create an unconstitutional conflict of interest.

28 U.S. Code § 455 - Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge): This federal statute requires judges to disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, or where they have a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.

Porter v. Porter (Porter v. Porter): Addresses the practice of an attorney filing an affidavit on behalf of a client, asserting the status
of that client.

II. Mayors

People v. Vacco (People v. Vacco): Addresses conflict of interest and official misconduct charges against a mayor who used his position for personal gain.

Scott v. Town of Cicero (Scott v. Town of Cicero): Addresses allegations of corruption and conflicts of interest involving town officials, including the town president (mayor).

Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILCS 5/3.1-50-5 (65 ILCS 5/3.1-50-5): This Illinois statute addresses conflicts of interest for municipal officers, including mayors. It prohibits them from having a direct or indirect financial interest in any contract, work, or business of the municipality.

III. Sheriffs

State v. Hovis (State v. Hovis): Addresses conflict of interest charges against a sheriff who allegedly used his position for personal gain.

Matter of Sheriff of Broome County (Matter of Sheriff of Broome County): Addresses allegations of misconduct and misuse of authority by a sheriff.

Deyo v. Detroit Creamery Co (Deyo v. Detroit Creamery Co): Addresses statutes forbidding administering of oath by attorneys in cases in which they may be engaged applies to affidavits.

IV. General Principles and Considerations

Due Process: As Caperton illustrates, due process requires recusal when a conflict of interest creates a serious risk of actual bias. This principle applies to all public officials, including judges, mayors, and sheriffs.

Statutory Prohibitions: Many states have statutes that prohibit public officials from having financial interests in contracts or transactions involving their government entity.

Ethical Codes: Judges, mayors, and sheriffs are often subject to ethical codes that address conflicts of interest. These codes may provide more specific guidance than statutes or case law.

Appearance of Impropriety: Even if there is no actual conflict of interest, an appearance of impropriety can be grounds for disqualification or other disciplinary action.

SILENCE - THESE ARE THE BIG ONES BELOW - THIS IS WHAT PUBLIC OFFICIALS DO TO OUR CITIZENS - WITH NO RECOURSE

U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d. 1021; U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F. 2d. 297, 299, 300 (1977):

Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal and moral duty to speak or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. We cannot condone this shocking conduct... If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately.

Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P. 2d. 155, 135 Ariz. 480 (1983):

Fraud and deceit may arise from silence where there is a duty to speak the truth, as well as from speaking an untruth. In regard to courts of record: “If the court is not in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, but of some special statutory jurisdiction, it is as to such proceeding an inferior court, and not aided by presumption in favor of jurisdiction.”

"Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading... We cannot condone this shocking conduct... If that is the case we hope our message is clear.
This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately"
U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F2d 997, 299-300,

"Fraud and deceit may arise from silence where there is a duty to speak the truth, as well as from speaking an untruth.
" Morrison v Acton, 198 P.2d 590, 68 Ariz. 27 ( Ariz. 1948)

"Fraud" may be committed by a failure to speak when the duty of speaking is imposed as much as by speaking falsely.
" Batty v Arizona State Dental Board, 112 P.2d 870, 57 Ariz. 239. (1941),

“Once a fraud, always a fraud.” 13 Vin. Abr. 539.

Public Officials - No Qualified Immunity

Relevant American Jurisprudence (Am. Jur.)
American Jurisprudence (Am. Jur.) sections that support the case law examples I provided earlier. Here are some relevant Am. Jur. sections:

Judges:

• Am. Jur. 2d, Judges § 5: This section states that judges are not entitled to absolute immunity from lawsuits alleging constitutional violations.

• Am. Jur. 2d, Judges § 6: This section states that judges can be held liable for their actions if they violate a clearly established constitutional right.

• Am. Jur. 2d, Judges § 7: This section states that judges can be held liable for their actions if they act with malice or in bad faith.

Sheriffs:

• Am. Jur. 2d, Sheriffs § 5: This section states that sheriffs can be held liable for their actions if they violate a constitutional right.

• Am. Jur. 2d, Sheriffs § 6: This section states that sheriffs can be held liable for their actions if they act with malice or in bad faith.

• Am. Jur. 2d, Sheriffs § 7: This section states that sheriffs can be held liable for their actions if they fail to train their employees properly.

Police:

• Am. Jur. 2d, Police Officers § 5: This section states that police officers can be held liable for their actions if they violate a constitutional right.

• Am. Jur. 2d, Police Officers § 6: This section states that police officers can be held liable for their actions if they act with malice or in bad faith.

• Am. Jur. 2d, Police Officers § 7: This section states that police officers can be held liable for their actions if they fail to follow proper procedures.

Other Cases:

• Am. Jur. 2d, Civil Rights § 5: This section states that public officials, including judges, sheriffs, and police, can be held liable for their actions if they violate a constitutional right.

• Am. Jur. 2d, Civil Rights § 6: This section states that public officials can be held liable for their actions if they act with malice or in bad faith.

• Am. Jur. 2d, Civil Rights § 7: This section states that public officials can be held liable for their actions if they fail to follow proper procedures.

Owen v. Independence, 100 S.C.T. 1398, 445 US 622:
“Officers of the court have no immunity, when violating a Constitutional right, from liability. For they are deemed to know the law.”

Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from civil liability unless they violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights. However, when officials deliberately remain silent in situations where they have a duty to disclose information or when their silence is intentionally misleading, this can constitute a form of fraud or deception that shall disqualify them from qualified immunity protection.

The courts have indicated that such "shocking conduct" and "deception will not be tolerated." When officials engage in deliberate deception through silence, they step outside their legitimate authority and the protective shield of qualified immunity may no longer apply, as they are knowingly violating established rights through their deceptive conduct.

JP & Associates provided invaluable support in navigating my case. Their expertise in constitutional rights made a significant difference in my legal journey. Highly recommended!

John D.

★★★★★

Contact Us for Legal Support

Reach out for guidance on your constitutional rights and SUPPORT.